Closing and Liquidation of Banks in Texas by Skillern, Frank L., Jr.
SMU Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 5 Article 2
1972
Closing and Liquidation of Banks in Texas
Frank L. Skillern Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frank L. Skillern Jr., Closing and Liquidation of Banks in Texas, 26 Sw L.J. 830 (1972)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol26/iss5/2
CLOSING AND LIQUIDATION OF BANKS IN TEXAS
by
Frank L. Skillern, Jr.*
T HE RECENT publicity over the closing of the Sharpstown State Bank
has caused attorneys and the general public to become aware of the impact
of a bank closing upon a community. In the Sharpstown case this impact has
been widely felt, directly and indirectly affecting Texas politicians, as well
as former depositors of the Sharpstown State Bank. Hundreds of lawsuits have
been filed as a result of the closing of the bank, most of them in Texas, but
others in such far removed places as Florida and Oregon. Such a wide impact
might be expected, as Sharpstown State Bank involved the largest payoff of
insured deposits in the history of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC).
It is not as widely known that the closing of the Sharpstown State Bank in
January 1971 was the fifteenth bank closing in Texas since 1964, an average
of almost two per year. This fact is not particularly surprising, since Texas
has more banks than any other state in the nation,' largely due to the pro-
hibition of branch banking in Texas.8
This Article is written from the vantage point of an attorney who has
represented the FDIC, in whole or in part, in connection with the receivership
and liquidation of the fifteen banks which have closed in Texas since 1964."
The following table lists each of these banks, with pertinent statistics:'
Year Name of Bank Number of Amount of Deposits
of Closing and location Depositors (rounded to thousands)
1964 First National Bank 2,215 $ 3,459,000
Marlin, Texas
1964 First State Bank 719 1,082,000
Dell City, Texas
1965 Winona State Bank 498 435,000
Winona, Texas
1965 Malone State Bank 695 525,000
Malone, Texas
1965 First State Bank 759 447,000
Covington, Texas
1966 Blanket State Bank 1,556 1,183,000
Blanket, Texas
1966 First State Bank 2,398 3,081,000
Tuscola, Texas
1967 Sacul State Bank 617 724,000
Sacul, Texas
B.A., LL.B., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.1 Deposits at the time of the closing were $66,903,000. FDIC, ANNUAL REPORT (1971).
2As of Dec. 31, 1971, Texas had 1,215 banks; the state with the next largest number
was Illinois with 1,134, and Minnesota was next with 732. By comparison, New York had
only 431 banks (with 2,939 branches) and California had 152 banks (with 3,176 branches).
FDIC, ANNUAL REPORT (1971).
3 TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 16.4 The writer is in no way speaking for or on behalf of the FDIC.5 FDIC, ANNUAL REPORTS (1964-1971).
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1968 Lorenzo State Bank 2,179 5,612,000
Lorenzo, Texas
1969 Citizens State Bank 2,343 2,300,000
Alvarado, Texas
1969 First State Bank 688 1,085,000
Dodson, Texas
1969 State National Bank 2,030 3,814,000
Lovelady, Texas
1969 Big Lake State Bank 2,642 4,426,000
Big Lake, Texas
1969 First State Bank 6,459 10,472,000
Aransas Pass, Texas
1971 Sharpstown State Bank 27,403 66,903,000
Houston, Texas
An examination of this list reveals that, except for Sharpstown State Bank, all
of the closed banks have been relatively small banks located in small towns.
I. THE CLOSING
The FDIC has no authority to close any bank. A bank may be closed only
by its chartering authority, which would be the Comptroller of the Currency
in the case of a national bank or the Banking Commissioner of Texas in the
case of a state bank in Texas.
A. National Banks
The procedure for appointment of a receiver of a national bank is provided
by statute.! The only requirement of the statute is that the Comptroller "be-
come satisfied" of the bank's insolvency. It has long been held that the Comp-
troller has this power without a previous judicial finding of the necessity for
such appointment. In Bushnell v. Leland the Supreme Court specifically held
that such a procedure did not vest judicial power in the Comptroller in viola-
tion of the United States Constitution. Thus, it is not whether the Bank is
insolvent, but whether the Comptroller is satisfied that it is insolvent.' Neither
the bank nor its shareholders "in the absence of fraud charged and proved"
are entitled to a judicial determination on the question of solvency.! A similar
result was reached in United States Savings Bank v. Morgenthau, in which the
bank contended that it was solvent, but the court rejected the bank's argument,
6 12 U.S.C. S 191 (1970).
7164 U.S. 684 (1897).
'The strongest statement of the Comptroller's powers in this regard is found in Liberty
Nat'l Bank v. McIntosh, 16 F.2d 906 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 783 (1927). The
case involved an action to declare void the appointment of a receiver by the Comptroller,
in which the court stated:
It will be observed that by the first section of the amended act . . . there is
placed apparently no limitation to what [the Comptroller) may do when the
proper conditions arise for the exercise of the authority and discretion reposed
in him .... The convenience of large numbers of the public perhaps affected
by what is to be done, and the serious disturbance of business conditions liable
to be involved, would seem to justify and warrant this grant of power to an
official of the dignity and importance of the Comptroller of the Currency.
Id. at 908.
1 Id. at 909.
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stating that it would not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the Comp-
troller, "unless it appears by convincing proof that the Comptroller's action is
plainly arbitrary and in bad faith."10 Likewise, in B. V. Emery & Co. v. Wilkin-
son the court stated that the acts of the Comptroller in finding the insolvency of
a national bank and appointing a receiver are "quasi judicial" in character
and "may only be voided by a court in a direct proceeding for clear error of
law, fraud, or mistake."'"
In one instance in Texas, the stockholders of a national bank brought suit
to enjoin the liquidation of the bank and return control of the bank to its
officers, directors, and employees." The stockholders sued in the name of the
bank and named as defendants the Secretary of the Treasury of the United
States, the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, and the employee of the
FDIC designated as liquidator of the bank. The complaint alleged that the
bank was not insolvent, and that the determination of the insolvency by the
Comptroller was arbitrary and capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The
defendants moved to dismiss; the court granted the motion holding, as a matter
of law, that the court lacked "jurisdiction to review the Comptroller of the
Currency's satisfaction that the State National Bank of Lovelady was insolvent
and the subsequent appointment of a receiver for such national banking asso-
ciation.' 0
B. State Banks
The Banking Commissioner of Texas has the authority to close a state bank
and liquidate its assets under the Texas Banking Code if he finds that it is
insolvent or in danger of becoming insolvent.'" If the Commissioner finds that
the bank is conducting its affairs in an unsafe manner, he has the power to
require that the board of directors take the steps necessary to correct the sit-
uation. If the directors fail to comply with his request within ten days, the
Commissioner must certify the facts of the situation to the state Banking
Board. The Board must then hold a hearing, and has the power to order the
bank's assets liquidated.' The Banking Code specifically gives a state bank
which has been closed by the Commissioner the right to bring suit in the
district court of the bank's domicile to enjoin the Commissioner from liquida-
ting the bank.' Such suit must be brought within five days from the closing
of the bank. In view of the fact that the Commissioner retains possession of
the assets of the bank pending a trial on the merits and appeal, it is not sur-
prising that there are no reported cases in which such a suit has been insti-
gated. In connection with the closing of the Sacul State Bank by the Banking
Commissioner in 1967, a majority of the members of the board of directors
of the bank brought suit against the Banking Commissioner and Deputy
1085 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 605 (1936).
1172 F.2d 10, 12 (10th Cir. 1934). See also Munro v. Post, 102 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.
1939); Crawford v. Gamble, 57 F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1932); Port Newark Nat'l Bank v.
Waldron, 46 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1930).
", State Nat'l Bank v. Kennedy, Civil No. 4999 (E.D. Tex., filed June 24, 1969).
18 Id., Conclusions of Law.
*"Tx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-803 (1959).
15 id.
10Id. art. 342-805 (1959).
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Commissioner, alleging that these officials had arbitrarily and capriciously
closed the bank without giving the directors sufficient opportunity to correct
its problems. Interestingly, the plaintiffs did not allege that the bank was
solvent, but alleged that "under valid theories of both accounting and banking
... the Bank is not insolvent or hopelessly broke.., but at worst is only in
the position of needing temporary infusion of additional capital, all of which
is a minor matter ... ."" After hearing testimony, the trial court denied plain-
tiffs' request for a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from liquid-
ating the assets of the bank. This ruling was not appealed. There has been no
other contest of the closing of a state bank in Texas during the period since
1964.
II. AcTivITY OF FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
A. Receiverships
Appointment. If the Comptroller of the Currency appoints a receiver of a
national bank, such receiver must be the FDIC.8 The FDIC is also authorized
to act without bond as receiver of a state bank located in Texas whose deposits
are insured to any extent by the FDIC and which has been closed "on account
of inability to meet the demands of its depositors."' 9 Under federal law, a bank
is deemed to have been closed "on account of inability to meet the demands of
its depositors in any case in which it has been closed for the purpose of
liquidation without adequate provision being made for payment of its de-
positors."20 The mechanism set out in the Texas Banking Code for such
appointment is a tender by the Banking Commissioner and acceptance by the
FDIC (both usually by telegram). The statute further states that upon the
acceptance of the appointment by the FDIC "the possession of and title to all
the assets, business and property of such banking institution of every kind and
nature shall pass to and vest in said Corporation and without the execution of
any instruments of conveyance, assignment, transfer or endorsement."'"
Pursuant to these provisions, the FDIC has acted as receiver for all state
banks closed in Texas in recent years.
Court Supervision. In both state and national bank receiverships, the receiver
must secure authority from an appropriate court for certain of its actions.
National Banks. The receiver of a national banking association is directed by
statute to "take possession of the books, records and assets of every description
of such association" and "to collect all debts, dues and claims belonging to it.""
The same statute provides that the receiver "upon order of a court of record
of competent jurisdiction, may sell or compound all bad or doubtful debts,
and, on a like order, may sell all real and personal property of such association,
'" Gordon v. Falkner, Civil No. 14,208 (145th Jud. Dist. of Nacogdoches County, filed
June 29, 1967).
1812 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1970).
19 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 489b, S 3 (1959); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (1970).
2012 U.S.C. S 1821(b) (1970).9 Tx RiV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 489b, S 7 (1959).
22 12 U.S.C. § 192 (1970).
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on such terms as the Court shall direct . 2.2.."' The United States district court
where the insolvent bank is located has been held to be the court of competent
jurisdiction, referred to in the statute.'
It has been held that the statute does not contemplate notice to interested
parties.' Although the receiver cannot sell the bank's assets without court
approval, the court, in acting on such a request, is not adjudicating a judicial
controversy or determining the rights of adverse parties, but is acting in an
administrative or supervisory capacity.' In Roth v. Hood the court fully dis-
cussed its role in considering an application for authority to sell assets of a
bank:
The action of the receiver is purely administrative and the provisions of the
act that he shall obtain an order of a court of competent jurisdiction before
selling does no more than make the court a superior and advisory agent in
the administrative field. Its order adjudicates no rights. It is merely a condition
precedent to the receiver's power to sell. 'It is the exercise of a visitatorial
power, given to the court by the statute and limited to that function. It is an
administrative check upon the otherwise uncontrolled powers of the Comp-
troller.'7
Thus, the court's order in acting upon such application is not reviewable by an
appellate court. 8
State Banks. The Texas Banking Code provides that the court receivership of
a state bank is initiated by the filing of an inventory of assets of the bank in
the office of the district clerk of the county of the bank's domicile." The assets
of the bank are deemed to be in the custody of the court in which the pro-
ceeding is pending. This court has "exclusive jurisdiction" over all suits and
orders provided in this chapter of the Banking Code.'
The receiver may take the following steps pursuant to the order of the
state district court: (1) sell any of the assets of the bank; (2) borrow money
and pledge all or part of the assets to secure the debt; (3) compromise or
compound any bad or doubtful claim held by or asserted against the bank;
(4) enter into "any other kind or character of contract or agreement on behalf
of such bank which he deems necessary or proper to the management, con-
servation or liquidation of its assets;" 1 and (5) pay dividends to depositors
and creditors who have established their claims.2 In addition, the expenses of
2138d.
'Whelan v. Blankenbeckler, 87 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1936); Wier v. Texas Co., 79 F.
Supp. 299 (W.D. La. 1948), aff'd, 180 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1950).
' Dugger v. Cox, 110 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1938).
"
8Griggs v. Baumer, 130 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1942); Rooth v. Hood, 106 F.2d 616 (6th
Cir. 1939); Hulse v. Argetsinger, 18 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1927); Reibman v. FDIC, 66 F.
Supp. 409 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 156 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1946).
27 106 F.2d 616, 618 (6th Cir. 1939), quoting Hulse v. Argetsinger, 18 F.2d 944, 945
(2d Cir. 1927).
"
8Griggs v. Baumer, 130 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1942); Mitchell v. Joseph, 117 F.2d 253
(7th Cit. 1941); Whelan v. Blankenbeckler, 87 F.2d 81 (5th Cit. 1936); Fifer v. Williams,
5 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1925).
29 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-806 (1959).
30 Id.
21 Id. art. 342-812.
"2 Id. art. 342-814.
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liquidation are authorized to be paid out of the bank's assets, "subject to
review and approval by order of the district court."'
It is specifically provided that the receivership court may enter any such order
with or without hearing and that all parties interested in the affairs of the
bank are bound and precluded by the action of the receiver in actions taken
pursuant to court orders.' Notice and hearing on an application is set by the
court only "if it deems it advantageous or proper."' The law is not clear
whether an order entered by the court in state bank receiverships is appealable.
There are no cases considering this point under the present statute. However, in
In re Marietta State Bank' the Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals specifically
held that the court order approving or rejecting the expense account of the
Banking Commissioner acting as liquidator of a state bank was a judicial act,
rather than an administrative one, and appealable. The case was decided under
a prior statute, which was similar to the present article 342-813." The dis-
senting judge stated that the order was not a final judgment and, therefore, not
appealable." In a later case, Gossett v. Griffin & Kimbrough," the San Antonio
Court of Civil Appeals held that a judgment by the receivership court allowing
a claim was a final judgment and appealable.
It is submitted that an order of the receivership court entered under article
342-812 would not be appealable due to the specific provision in the statute
that "all parties interested in the affairs of such bank shall be bound and pre-
cluded by the action of the Commissioner." An appeal from the rejection of
a claim is, by statute, a separate suit in the district court, and the statute pro-
vides that if no such suit is brought, "the action of the Commissioner shall
be final and not subject to review."4 No appeal has been taken from any order
of a Texas receivership court in recent years, other than by separate suit on a
rejected claim, and such appeals will probably not be allowed in the future.
Claims Procedure for National Banks. Upon the appointment of a receiver,
the Comptroller is directed to give notice "by advertisement in such news-
papers as he may direct, for three consecutive months, calling on all persons
who have claims against such association to present the same, and to make
legal proof thereof."'" However, presentation of a claim to the receiver is not
a prerequisite to suit on the claim.'
Claims Procedure for State Banks. The receiver of an insolvent state bank is
required to give notice to depositors and creditors by publication once a week




" 35 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1931).
31 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-813 (1959).
35 S.W.2d at 769 (Wilson, C.J., dissenting).
39 107 S.W.2d 1115 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937), error dismissed.
40TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-811 (1959).
41 12 U.S.C. S 193 (1970).
'Queenan v. Mays, 90 F.2d 525 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 725 (1937);
Schulenberg v. Norton, 49 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1931).
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requiring the depositors and creditors to file written proofs of claim.' Within
thirty days after the first publication, the receiver must mail a similar notice
to each depositor or creditor shown upon the books of the bank." The Banking
Code in this instance, as elsewhere, directs the Commissioner to take this action,
but it is done by the FDIC pursuant to the statute authorizing the FDIC to
act as receiver. '
Depositors, creditors, and other persons "asserting any claim of any charac-
ter against a state bank in the process of liquidation" are given eighteen months
from the date of first publication of notice to creditors to present their claims."
The claim must be signed and sworn to by the claimant."7 The receiver is given
three months after receipt of a claim to approve or reject it in whole or in
part, and, if the claim is rejected, the receiver must notify the claimant by
registered mail. 8 The Banking Code then requires any claimant to sue the
rejected claim within three months from the date of mailing of notice by the
Commissioner; otherwise the action of the Commissioner is final and not
subject to review."
Unlike national bank receiverships, the presentation of a proper claim
against a state bank receiver is a condition precedent to the filing of suit on the
same subject matter. In fact, an essential element of any cause of action against
a state bank in liquidation is an allegation that the plaintiff has presented his
claim to the liquidator and it has been rejected, or an allegation of facts which
would excuse such a presentation. This rule was clearly stated in L.G. Balfour
Co. v. Gossett" in which a suit was pending against a state bank at the time
of its insolvency and the Banking Commissioner, as receiver for the bank,
was made a party to the suit. The Commissioner contended, among other things,
that no cause of action was stated because the pleading did not allege that the
claim was presented to and rejected by the Commissioner before he was made
a party defendant. The Supreme Court of Texas acknowledged that the general
rule was that "no action can be maintained against the Banking Commissioner
on a claim against an insolvent state bank unless and until such claim has
been presented to and rejected by such Commissioner." 1 The court pointed
out that this rule was not contained within the statutes, and merely arose by
implication from the provisions of the statutes. The court then held that such
an implication was not necessary, and such a rule would not be applied to a
claim already in litigation at the time the bank failed. This case, and others,"'
were decided prior to the adoption of the present statute in 1943."' The termi-
nology of the statute under which these cases were decided, however, was
" TEx. Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-808 (1959).
"Id. art. 342-802.
"Id. art. 489b.
"a Id. art. 342-809.
471d.
4The time may be extended by written agreement with the claimant. Id. art. 342-810.
4Id. Such a suit is tried de novo in the district court, and is subject to the rules of
procedure and appeal applicable to civil cases. Id.
"0131 Tex. 348, 115 S.W.2d 594 (1938).
11 131 Tex. at 353, 115 S.W.2d at 597.
52 See, e.g., Brand v. Conner & McRae, 78 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934),
error" ref.
"3TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 342-801 to -816 (1959).
" Ch. 15, S 9 [1909] Tex. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 408.
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similar to the present statute, the principal difference being a six-months
limitation period for filing suit after rejection of the claim, rather than a
three-month limitation.
The rule that the claim must be made or excused before initiation of the
suit is applicable regardless of the nature of the claim. In City of Harrisburg
v. Austin5 plaintiff brought suit against the Banking Commissioner of Texas,
as receiver of an insolvent state bank, seeking orders restraining and enjoining
the Commissioner and other defendants from listing certain municipal bonds
issued by the city of Harrisburg as an asset of the bank in liquidation, and
from, in any manner, disposing of or encumbering the bonds. The complaint
further contended that the plaintiff should be declared to have title to the
bonds, and should be given possession of the bonds. The court held that the
plaintiff was a claimant within the specific language of the statute concerning
bank liquidation, and, thus, was required to present the claim to the Commis-
sioner for approval or rejection before a suit could be maintained on the
claim. The court explained that "the use of the words 'any claim' in [the
statute] should, in view of the general dominant purpose of the act, be under-
stood as including not only claims for money due by the bank, but also claims
for personal property held by the bank under apparent titled claim of owner-
ship." Although this case was decided under the old statute," the present
statute refers to "any claim of any character,"" and the rule would appear
still to apply.
Under some circumstances the filing of a claim may be excused. For in-
stance, in Gossett v. Green ' the Banking Commissioner, as receiver of an in-
solvent bank, brought suit against Green based on a promissory note allegedly
signed by Green payable to the bank. Fifteen months later, Green filed a
counterclaim against the Banking Commissioner for an amount allegedly due
him from the bank. The Banking Commissioner filed a general demurrer,
alleging that the counterclaim could not be maintained until Green had pre-
sented his claim and it had been rejected. The court acknowledged the general
rule that the applicable statutes "contemplate that the claim be so first pre-
sented in order that the commissioner may be afforded the opportunity first to
pass upon the claim and that the liquidation of the bank may be conducted in
an orderly manner and, as far as possible, without the expense, complications
and delay incident to litigation."" The court found, however, that by first
filing suit against Green, it was apparent that the Commissioner "had been
afforded the opportunity to consider, investigate and pass upon Green's claim,""1
and that the purpose of the requirement of presentation was accomplished.
It is submitted that nothing short of the filing of a separate suit by the re-
ceiver on the same or related subject matter will excuse the requirement that
279 S.W. 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1926), error ref.
" Id. at 499-500.
57Ch. 15, S 9 [1909] Tex. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 409.
51TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-809 (1959).
11137 Tex. 50, 152 S.W.2d 733 (1941).
"Id. at 55, 152 S.W.2d at 736.
" Id. at 56, 152 S.W.2d at 737.
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the claim be presented and rejected prior to suit unless the case was pending
against the bank prior to its closing.
B. Assumption Transactions
After a bank is closed in Texas, the FDIC has two alternatives. It may accept
the receivership and pay off depositors up to the insured limit;" or, it may
give financial assistance to another insured bank, either one in existence or a
newly formed bank, to assume the deposit liabilities of the closed bank. The
second alternative results in payment in full to all general creditors of the
closed bank. The Board of Directors of the FDIC determines which alternative
it will take; however, an assumption transaction is entered into only where
the known facts indicate that the cost would be less to the FDIC. One key
factor that goes into this decision is the presence or absence of contingent
liabilities, such as lawsuits pending against the bank, the value of which
cannot accurately be assessed by the Board of Directors. The existence of sub-
stantial contingent liabilities will usually dictate a receivership and payoff
rather than an assumption transaction. Another factor taken into consideration
is the amount of deposits in the bank in excess of the insured limit. Of the
banks that have closed in Texas since 1964, the banks at Malone, Covington,
Blanket, Tuscola, Lorenzo, Big Lake, and Aransas Pass involved assumption
transactions; the other banks listed in the table at the beginning of this Article
were receiverships.
The statutory authority for the assumption transaction is found in section
13 (e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act."3 The basic idea in an assumption
transaction is that certain assets are transferred to the assuming bank, together
with enough cash from the FDIC to equal the deposit liabilities being assumed
by such bank. In exchange for the cash, the FDIC takes the other assets
(primarily the assets which have created the problems in the bank) and
liquidates them.
Procedure. The procedure employed in an assumption transaction is generally
as follows:" (1) If the Regional Director of the FDIC believes that an
assumption transaction is feasible, the Banking Commissioner of Texas, as
statutory receiver of the closed bank, makes a formal application for financial
assistance in the form of a loan secured by the assets of the closed bank or
an outright sale of the assets. (2) The Board of Directors of the FDIC acts
on the request. (3) Assuming that the request is granted, all parties who
might have an interest are contacted and advised that the Banking Commis-
sioner, as receiver of the closed bank, will present a petition to the district
'Now $20,000. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m) (Supp. 1972).
6312 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1970). See also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 489b, 5 5
(1959).
"This procedure is the one that has generally been followed in assumption transactions
in Texas and does not purport to speak to the exact procedure followed in other jurisdictions.
It assumes that the closed bank is a state bank rather than a national bank, as has been the
case in all assumption transactions in Texas in recent years.
An assumption transaction is possible with a closed national bank. In such an instance,
the FDIC in its corporate capacity would be dealing with itself in its capacity as receiver,
or the transaction could be consummated with the bank prior to its closing when insolvency
appears imminent. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d) (1970).
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court of the county in which the bank is located, seeking authority to sell all
of the assets of the closed bank. Depending on a number of factors, such as
the size of the bank, size of the community, and the reason for insolvency,
there may be many parties interested in assuming the deposit liabilities of the
new bank, or there may be few or only one.
Bidding. A petition is filed by the Banking Commissioner, as statutory receiver
of the closed bank, seeking authority to sell the assets of the insolvent bank,
and a hearing date is set, usually within a few days after the petition is filed.
All interested parties are invited to submit sealed bids to be opened by the
court; usually, these bids must include the following information: (1) name
of the party submitting the bid; (2) if it is on behalf of a new bank to be
founded, the names of the organizers and the proposed capital strength of the
new bank; and (3) the dollar amount, if any, that the bidder will pay as a
premium. In many instances, the bidder is required to buy the bank building
and its furniture and fixtures, and if so, the bid would also include the amount
offered for such items.
The bidders are advised that the Banking Commissioner and the FDIC
reserve the right to reject all bids. In this regard, any new bank would need a
charter from the State Banking Board and deposit insurance from the FDIC.
Thus, it would be possible that no bids would be acceptable.
The bids are opened by the judge and studied by representatives of the
Banking Commissioner and the FDIC. If a bid is accepted, an announcement
is made and the court enters its order authorizing the sale. If the acceptable
bid is by an existing bank, such bank must immediately have a special meeting
of its board of directors authorizing the assumption transaction and authorizing
the execution of the various documents involved. If the acceptable bid is on
behalf of a bank to be organized, the applicants must obtain their charter and
then hold the board meeting.
Closing. At the closing, the following documents are generally executed:
(1) an agreement between the FDIC and the Banking Commissioner of
Texas, as receiver of the insolvent bank, transferring the so-called unacceptable
assets to the FDIC, either as an outright transfer or as security for a loan;
(2) a separate assignment from the Banking Commissioner as receiver to
the FDIC, which includes any claim against the bank's officers, directors, or
employees arising out of the performance or manner of performance of their
duties and all claims under any fidelity bonds issued to the bank; (3) power
of attorney from the Banking Commissioner as receiver of the insolvent bank
to the FDIC; (4) an agreement between the assuming bank and the FDIC;
and (5) an agreement between the Banking Commissioner of Texas as re-
ceiver of the insolvent bank and the assuming bank, under which the assuming
bank agrees to assume and pay certain stated liabilities of the insolvent bank,
including all deposit liabilities, and the receiver transfers the appropriate assets
to the assuming bank."
6' Such assets would usually include the bank building and furniture and fixtures, cash
due from banks, and securities. If the assuming bank has had an opportunity to examine the
1972]
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The assumption transaction has been extensively used by the FDIC through-
out the years and, in such instances, depositors in the insolvent bank are paid in
full, even if the deposit is in excess of the insured limit.
II. LITIGATION
A. Jurisdiction
Any suit by or against the FDIC in its corporate capacity is deemed by
statute to arise under the laws of the United States, without regard to the
amount in controversy." The only type of case which is specifically deemed not
to arise under the laws of the United States is one to which the FDIC is a
party "in its capacity as receiver of a state bank and one which involves only
the rights or obligations of depositors, creditors, stockholders and such state
bank under state law.""7 It has long been held, however, that the federal courts
have jurisdiction over cases by or against a receiver of a national bank."8 Thus,
federal courts have jurisdiction of all cases filed by or against the FDIC as
receiver of a national bank or in its corporate capacity as assignee of a state
bank in an assumption transaction.
With respect to litigation involving the FDIC as receiver of a state bank,
the Texas Banking Code provides that the assets are deemed to be in the
custody of the court in which liquidation proceedings have been initiated
(by filing an inventory of assets) and "all suits and orders provided for under
this chapter shall be deemed to be in the nature of interventions or orders in
said proceedings, of which suits and orders said court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction."" Under a prior statute, the Texas Supreme Court held that the
district court of the county where the bank was located was the court "in which
all actions for the establishment of rejected claims against the insolvent bank
must be brought, regardless of contractual venue or jurisdictional amount.""*
The statutes then in effect were generally similar to the ones in effect today, and
this holding would appear to be the law under the present Banking Code.1
In the event there is more than one district court in a county, the case may
be transferred from the receivership court to any other district court of that
loan portfolio, the assuming bank could purchase certain of the insolvent bank's notes, al-
though usually it later purchases such notes directly from the FDIC.
"12 U.S.C. 5 1819 (1970). However, there is no jurisdiction provided in § 1819 for
a suit directly against the FDIC which is based on tort. A plaintiff must bring a tort action
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Freeling v. FDIC, 221 F. Supp.
955 (D. Okla. 1962), afJ'd, 326 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1963).
67 12 U.S.C. S 1819 (1970). For a discussion of the distinction between the FDIC in
its capacity as receiver of a state bank and as insuror of deposits in such a bank, and the
effect of this distinction on federal court jurisdiction, see Freeling v. Sebring, 296 F.2d 244
(10th Cir. 1961).
08 28 U.S.C. S 1348 (1970) provides that the district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action to wind up the affairs of a national banking association. See Inter-
national Trust Co. v. Weeks, 203 U.S. 364 (1906); Larabee Flour Mills v. First Nat'l Bank,
13 F.2d 330 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 727 (1926).
69TIx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-806 (1959).70 Kidder v. Hall, 113 Tex. 49, 251 S.W. 497 (1923).
7'See Innes v. State Banking Bd., 113 Tex. 300, 254 S.W. 116 (1923); Brand v. Hood,
85 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1935), error dismissed; Chapman v. Seabury,
263 S.W. 1107 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924); Hall v. Eastland County, 254 S.W.
1113 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1923).
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county for trial; the judgment is then certified back to the court in which the
bank is being liquidated for enforcement.'
Two cases seem to be in conflict with these seemingly clear holdings. In
Ogden v. Edwards" suit was brought against the Banking Commissioner, as
receiver of an insolvent bank, and others on a debt and to foreclose vendors'
liens on real property located in Yoakum County. The suit was filed in Yoakum
County though the closed bank was located in Lubbock County. The case
was tried on the merits and judgment was entered foreclosing the liens as
against all defendants, but no personal judgment was entered against any of
them. The land was sold by the sheriff pursuant to an order of sale, and pur-
chased by the creditor and plaintiff in the case, Edwards. Later, one of the
defendants brought a separate suit to set aside the previous judgment of fore-
closure, contending that it was void, the court being without jurisdiction to
hear the case, as it involved property of an insolvent state bank located in
Lubbock County. The court of civil appeals held that the District Court of
Yoakum County had jurisdiction to hear the case, relying on the general
receivership statute which provides that a receiver may sue or be sued in any
court having jurisdiction of the cause of action."" The court further held that
the general venue statutes were applicable to a suit against the Banking Com-
missioner as receiver of an insolvent bank, and venue was proper in Yoakum
County as the land being foreclosed was located there. Likewise, in Gossett v.
First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank"' it was held that the district court of the
county where the land was located had jurisdiction of a suit against the receiver
of an insolvent bank located in another county. The court stated that the
judgment must then be presented to and enforced by the court in which the
receivership was pending.
It is submitted that these two decisions are not the law at the present time
and were probably incorrect when decided. The words "exclusive jurisdiction"
in the statute can have but one meaning. The only question in any case against
the receiver is whether it is a suit provided for under the chapter on bank
liquidations." Under the rationale of City of Harrisburg v. Austin," any claim
affecting property in the hands of the receiver would require a formal claim
and rejection as a condition precedent to maintaining suit; therefore, any suit
on such claim would be "one provided for" under chapter VIII of the Banking
Code and the district court of the bank's domicile should have exclusive juris-
diction of the action.
B. Rights of Receiver or Assignee
The general statement that the receiver of a bank has no greater rights than
the bank itself is often made." However, this rule is not entirely true in cases
72 L.G. Balfour Co. v. Gossett, 131 Tex. 348, 115 S.W.2d 594 (1938).
73 108 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937).
74TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2310 (1971).
75 138 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1940).
76See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-806 (1959).
77279 S.W. 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1926), error ref.7 In re Anjopa Paper & Bd. Mfg. Co., 269 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Chapman
v. Clark, 276 S.W. 197 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925), judgment adopted.
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involving the FDIC. In D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC"9 the FDIC sued on
a promissory note which it had acquired from a closed bank in an assumption
transaction. The note had been executed by the defendant in renewal of
previous notes to enable the bank not to show any past due bonds. The re-
ceipt for the notes contained the following statement: "This note is given with
the understanding it will not be called for payment. All interest payments to
be repaid.""0
The defendant alleged that the note sued upon had been given without any
consideration, with the understanding that no suit would be brought, and that
the FDIC was not a holder in due course. The FDIC alleged that it was a
holder in due course and that the defendant was estopped to assert the defenses
alleged. The district court held that the FDIC was an innocent holder of the
note in good faith and for value and that the defendant was estopped to assert
want of consideration as a defense. "1 The Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the district court judgment, not on the basis that the FDIC was a
holder in due course, but on the basis of a federal public policy protecting the
institution of banking.
"These provisions [sections 264(s) and (y) of 12 United States Code]
reveal a federal policy to protect respondent and the public funds which it
administers against misrepresentations as to the securities or other assets in the
portfolios of the banks which respondent insures or to which it makes loans.""
The Court explained that the test to be applied was "whether the note was
designed to deceive the creditors or the public authority or would tend to have
that effect."83 The Court specifically found that the defendant was not aware
of the use the bank made of the notes, but held that this fact was immaterial,
because the defendant "was responsible for the creation of a false status of
the note in the hands of the Bank."" The position of the FDIC under D'Oench,
Duhme when a secret agreement is involved was emphasized by the Third
Circuit in FDIC v. Alker:
Assuming that the Trust Company was negligent in failing to carry forward
some notation of the legends upon its records, it is clear that such negligence
may not be imputed to FDIC. The fact is that there was no record of any
agreement not to foreclose the collateral on the books of the Trust Company
when FDIC took possession of the consolidated note and of its collateral. The
agreement not to foreclose, assuming its existence, would still be a 'secret
agreement' within the purview of the D'Oench, Duhme decision."
"315 U.S. 447 (1942).
80Id. at 454.
81117 F.2d 491, 492 (8th Cir.), afl'd, 315 U.S. 447 (1941).
82315 U.S. at 457.
83 1d. at 460.
"Id. at 461.
85164 F.2d 469, 470 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 862 (1948). A similar
result was reached in a case recently decided in federal court in Lubbock, Texas. FDIC v.
Vineyard, 346 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Tex. 1972), involved a suit on a promissory note con-
veyed to the FDIC in an assumption transaction. The court noted that under § 3.302 (c) (i)
of the Texas Business and Commerce Code the FDIC would not be a holder in due course.
The court, however, cited D'Oench, Duhme as directly in point on two issues. First, federal,
rather than state, law is applicable to suits by the FDIC. (See also FDIC v. Rectenwall, 97
F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ind. 1951).) Second, the defendant's pleas of no consideration and an
agreement by the bank that the note would never be called were not available as a matter
of law. The court also noted that knowledge of guilt is not a prerequisite to liability.
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After the D'Oench, Duhme decision, some of the rights of the FDIC were
codified:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest
of the [FDIC] in any asset acquired by it under this section, either as security
for a loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the [FDIC] unless such agree-
ment (1) shall be in writing, (2) shall have been executed by the bank and
the person or persons claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the
obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank,
(3) shall have been approved by the board of directors of the bank or its
loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board
or committee, and (4) shall have been, continuously, from the time of its
execution, an official record of the bank."
The principle announced in D'Oench, Duhme has been followed in a
number of cases involving national and state bank receiverships. For example,
FDIC v. Motorlease, Inc."' concerned a contention by a guarantor and endorser
of a note that the note was executed and delivered to the maker's agent with
the understanding between the bank, himself, and the agent that the note was
to be used only under certain conditions. The guarantor also claimed lack of
consideration. The New York court, on the authority of D'Oench, Duhme,
held that this defense was legally insufficient.
Though such a result has never been reached in a state court receivership
in Texas involving the FDIC as receiver, the result would appear to be con-
sistent with Texas case law. Brand v. Korth" involved a suit whereby the
Banking Commissioner, as receiver of an insolvent bank, brought suit on a
note which was originally executed by defendant payable to himself and
endorsed by him. The defendant contended that the note was executed without
consideration solely for the purpose of lending his credit to the bank while it
was in a condition of financial distress. The trial court found for the defendant
and the court of civil appeals affirmed. The Texas Commission of Appeals in
an opinion adopted by the supreme court, reversed and rendered judgment in
favor of the Banking Commissioner: "Even conceding that the note was purely
an accommodation note, without consideration to defendant, we are of the
opinion that defendant, as against the Banking Commissioner in his capacity
as representative of the depositors and creditors of the insolvent bank, was
estopped to deny the legal obligations thereof."8 Brand did not involve an
actual agreement on the part of the defendant with bank officials to deceive
the bank examiners, as was present in Shaw v. Borchers," but the court found
that the mere placing of the note with the bank and allowing it to remain
there as an apparent asset had the same effect.9
80 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (e) (1970).
87288 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
88 128 Tex. 488, 99 S.W.2d 285 (1936).
9 Id. at 491, 99 S.W.2d at 286.
9046 S.W.2d 967 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932), judgment adopted.
"1See First Nat'l Bank v. Boxley, 129 Okla. 159, 264 P. 184 (1927); West Rutland
Trust Co. v. Houston, 104 Vt. 204, 158 A. 69 (1932). The Supreme Court of Texas quoted
with approval the description in the latter case of a transaction to deceive the bank exam-
iners as an illegal one, with its being against public policy to permit a party to such a
transaction to rely on it as a defense. See Annot., 64 A.L.R. 588 (1929). See also First
Nat'l Bank v. Brownson, 106 S.W.2d 1076 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937).
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In Farmers State Bank v. Largent" the court extended this rule to protect
the purchaser of assets from the Banking Commissioner of an insolvent bank.
In that case Largent had executed a note in renewal of a note for Grimes at
the request of the president of the bank so that the bank examiner would be
satisfied, with the express understanding and agreement that Largent would not
be called upon to pay the note. The payee bank became insolvent and the
notes were sold to the plaintiff bank by the Banking Commissioner as receiver
of the payee bank. The court held that the plaintiff bank succeeded to the rights
of the Banking Commissioner, having acquired the note for a valuable con-
sideration and that the defense of failure of consideration was not available
to the defendant.
C. Bond Claim
One type of litigation that usually arises after a bank closing is a claim on
the bank's fidelity bond."5 In fact, in many instances the success of the liquida-
tion is largely dependent upon recovery on the fidelity bond. Cases involving
the banks at Marlin and Lorenzo, both of which resulted in opinions by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, are illustrations of the
special problems faced by a bank receiver in such cases.
The first case, FDIC v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.," involved an elaborate
scheme whereby two individuals, Morris and Garrett, purchased the con-
trolling interest in the First National Bank of Marlin, Texas, through an agent,
Steiner. Morris and Garrett caused Steiner to be elected as a director of the
bank; however, he was not elected as an officer. Shortly after assuming con-
trol, Morris and Garrett caused Steiner to obtain a resolution of the bank's
board of directors to accept two deposits of $500,000 each (one from another
Texas bank owned by Morris and Garrett) and to purchase a like amount of
real estate notes. Shortly thereafter, Steiner advised the Deputy Comptroller of
the Currency in Dallas that he was acting as a front for Morris and Garrett,
who were the real owners of control of the bank. Steiner was instructed that
no assets were to be purchased by the bank out of the Marlin trade area and
that the bank was not to be involved in any transaction with Morris and
Garrett. These instructions were never passed on to the minority members of
the bank's board of directors. Approximately two weeks later, the bank's board
authorized the purchase of $1,000,000 in first lien real estate notes, subject
to Steiner's approval. The board minutes stated that Steiner would handle the
transaction. Steiner then purchased certain real estate notes for $970,000 and
the notes were delivered to the bank. Out of the $970,000, $189,186 was
paid with Steiner's knowledge, to a company that was a front for Morris and
Garrett. Upon a review of the notes purchased, it was apparent to the entire
board that most of them were not in conformance with the statutory require-
ments, in that three were' over the bank's legal limit of $20,000, and sixty-
four were for periods of time exceeding the bank's limit of twenty years. In
February 1964 the Comptroller's office became aware of the notes, and the
92 132 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939), error ref.
"Of the banks listed at the beginning of this Article, only the ones at Tuscola and Big
Lake did not involve bond claims.94426 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1970).
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bank was declared insolvent on March 10, 1964, when the notes could not be
sold.
The FDIC as receiver of the bank sold the notes for a net loss of $408,-
362.97. Notice of loss was given to the bank's fidelity bond carriers shortly
after the bank closed. The bonding companies denied liability on several
grounds, including a denial of coverage on Steiner, who was not an officer or
employee, but only a director; a denial of dishonesty on Steiner's part; and
a claim that notice and proof of loss had not been filed within the time limit
set out in the bonds." The court had no problem in finding Steiner dishonest,
as he specifically violated the instructions of the Deputy Comptroller of the
Currency. As to coverage for Steiner's acts, the court held, in an opinion of
first impression, that the so-called director's exclusion clause contained in the
bond was applicable. This clause provided that the bond did "not cover ...
any loss resulting from the act or acts of any director of the Insured, other than
one employed as a salaried, pensioned or elected official or an employee of the
Insured, except when performing acts coming within the usual duties of an
employee .... "" But the court found that in handling the purchase of the
real estate notes, Steiner was performing acts "coming within the usual duties
of an employee," i.e., that he was "acting in an officer-like capacity for the
bank."97 The court had more difficulty with the notice provision. Over a
strong dissent, the court found that the time for giving notice did not begin to
run until the bank closed and Steiner's fraudulent conduct was discovered.
The dissenting judge99 argued that the bank knew of Steiner's fraudulent con-
duct when the non-conforming nature of the notes was discovered, approxi-
mately six months before the bank closed, pointing out that the non-conform-
ing nature of the notes, which was disclosed on their face, made them illegal.
It is certainly arguable that the bank itself, with the ownership still in the
hands of Morris and Garrett, would have had a difficult time in making this
recovery, whereas the receiver was in a position to take a different approach
to the case.
Another example of a recovery by the FDIC on a fidelity bond in a case in
which the bank, had it remained open, would have had a difficult time, is
FDIC v. Lott.9" Lott, the president of the Lorenzo State Bank, made loans in
excess of the bank's legal limit and made loans, directly and indirectly, to a
company in which he held a personal interest. The bonding company denied
liability largely on two grounds: (1) that the directors knew of each of the
dishonest acts shortly after they were committed and therefore notice was not
timely given; and (2) that Lott, as controlling shareholder of the bank, was
not an employee but the bank's alter ego and, therefore, his acts were not
covered by the bonds. The bonding company relied largely on the two de-
cisions in Phoenix Savings & Loan Association v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
15 The pertinent bond provisions are quoted in the opinion. Generally the bonds covered
losses due to dishonest, fraudulent, or criminal acts of any of the bank's employees. Id. at
731, 732.9
" Id. at 762.
97 Id. at 738.
"Id. at 739 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
"'460 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Co., 0 which supported its second contention. To meet this defense, the FDIC,
which had acquired the cause of action in an assumption transaction, sued
the bonding company and the former directors of the bank in the alternative,
alleging that the directors were liable for the loss if in fact they knew of
Lott's dishonesty and failed to take any action thereon, or if they allowed Lott
to become the alter ego of the bank and thus prevented recovery under the
bonds. The jury found in favor of the directors and against the bonding
company on all issues, though the evidence showed that the directors had not
held a meeting for almost a year before the bank closed, and the examination
reports reflected loans in excess of the bank's legal limit. The judgment
further provided that any money to which Lott might be entitled as a stock-
holder should be paid to the surety 1
Part of the rationale of the Phoenix case was that recovery against the
surety would allow a dishonest person to profit from his own dishonesty. Such
a position would have been difficult, if not impossible, to rebut if Lott had in-
volved the bank as a going concern. However, in a suit by the FDIC against
the surety, such is not the case. As a result of this recovery, the FDIC recovered
its entire disbursement made in the assumption transaction, and substantial
sums were made available to pay to the bank's stockholders.
D. Directors' Liability
In each bank failure, the activities of the directors are carefully analyzed to
determine if suit should be instituted against the directors. Under state law,
directors and officers of state banks are liable for financial losses sustained by
the banks "to the extent that directors and officers of other corporations are
now responsible for such losses in equity and common law."1 ' The duties of
directors of state banks are generally set out in articles 8 and 9 of chapter IV
of the Banking Code."' These duties include the duty to supervise the conduct
of the bank's business; to hold monthly meetings, and at each meeting to
review and approve or disapprove each loan and investment made and item
of expense incurred since the last meeting; and, to elect officers. Also, each
director is required by the State Banking Department to sign a statement that
he has carefully considered the report and is familiar with all items contained
therein. In extreme instances, the directors are sent separate letters warning
them of their potential personal liability, and receipt of this letter must be
acknowledged. Thus, the Banking Department will have a record of warnings.
The failure to heed these warnings can result in personal liability."'
Under the National Bank Act, directors who "knowingly violate or know-
ingly permit" any of the officers or agents of the bank to violate any of the
provisions of the Act are personally liable for all damages which the bank,
its shareholders, or any other person sustains "in consequence of such vio-
lation."' "
1-'381 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1967), and 427 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1970).
101460 F.2d at 87.
102TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-410 (1959).
103 Id. arts. 342-408, -409.
'° See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 941 (1969).
'-s 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1970). The scope of this Article does not include a discussion of the
numerous cases decided under this statute.
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IV. DIVIDENDS AND FINAL REPORT
In state bank receiverships, dividends may be paid, with the approval of the
receivership court, to those depositors and creditors who have established their
claims.'*' It is the general practice of the FDIC to pay several dividends
throughout the course of the receivership as funds become available. All
creditors who do not file their claims within eighteen months of the date of
the first publication of notice to creditors'"' do not participate in any dividends
until after full payment of all approved claims presented during such period. '
The receiver of a national bank is not required to obtain a court order to pay
a dividend."'
In a receivership of a national or state bank, the FDIC in its corporate
capacity is subrogated to all rights of depositors for any insurance payments."'
The FDIC must share dividends pro rata, along with other creditors and
excess depositors, with no preference. There are generally no preferences or
priorities (other than expenses of the receivership) in either national or state
bank receiverships."'
After a final dividend is paid in a state bank receivership, the FDIC, as re-
ceiver, files its final report in the receivership court; the court sets a hearing and
directs such notice be given as the court deems proper."' If the court finds that
the affairs of the bank have been administered properly and in accordance with
law, the report is approved:
[IThe order of approval shall have the force and effect of forfeiting and can-
celling the corporate charter of such bank, vesting title to the remaining assets,
if any, in the stockholders of said bank, and releasing and discharging the
Commissioner from any further duty, obligation or liability in connection
with the administration of the affairs of such bank . .. ."
If assets are remaining, the court may designate a trustee to liquidate such
assets for the benefit of the former stockholders of the bank."'
In national bank receiverships, the receiver is directed to pay over the re-
mainder of the proceeds from liquidation, if any, to the shareholders of the
'10 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-814 (1959); Innes v. State Banking Bd., 113
Tex. 300, 254 S.W. 117 (1923).
"'
TTEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-809 (1959).
"00 Id. art. 342-814.10012 U.S.C. § 194 (1970) authorizes the receiver to pay ratable dividends on all
claims "as may have been proved to his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of competentjurisdiction" without reference to court authorization. For a full discussion of this provision,
see American Sur. Co. v. Bethlehem Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 314 (1941).11012 U.S.C. § 1821(g) (1970); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 489b, J 4 (1959).
... There are cases involving national banks that discuss preferences based on a trust
theory, but it is generally held that the imposition of such a trust and preference is, in the
words of Justice Cardozo, "plainly inconsistent with the system of equal distribution estab-
lished by the federal law." Jennings v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 294 U.S. 216, 226(1935). A few cases have recognized the possibility of a preferential recovery against the
receiver where the evidence proved that the property belonged to the claimant and not the
bank. See, e.g., FDIC v. Mademoiselle of Cal., 379 F.2d 660, 665 (9th Cir. 1967), in which
the court held that to obtain such a preference, the claimant "must be able to identify a
specific fund or payment in the possession of the receiver cognizable in equity" as the
claimant's own property.





bank or their legal representatives, in proportion to the stock held by them."'5
A formal final account is not required to be filed in the receivership court.
V. CONCLUSION
Bank liquidations in Texas during the past eight years have generally been
successful. Dividends paid to depositors and creditors to date in receiverships
are as follows:
Bank Dividend to Date
First National Bank 100%
Marlin, Texas
First State Bank 55% 116
Dell City, Texas
Winona State Bank 14.138%
Winona, Texas
Sacul State Bank 92.416%
Sacul, Texas
Citizens State Bank l00%17
Alvarado, Texas
First State Bank 604M11
Dodson, Texas
State National Bank 40%119
Lovelady, Texas
In assumption transactions the FDIC made full recovery of its disbursement
in connection with the banks of Covington, Lorenzo, and Big Lake, with the
remaining assets left for transfer back to the shareholders in each instance. In
addition, it is anticipated that there will be a full recovery in the Aransas Pass
liquidation. A full recovery is usually dependent upon collection of the claims
against the bonding company or the directors. In an assumption transaction,
it may be dependent upon the payment of a substantial premium by the in-
stitution that originally assumed the deposit liabilities of the insolvent bank.
It is interesting that considering the substantial amount of litigation in federal
and state courts in Texas that has resulted from banks that have closed in
recent years, very few appellate decisions have appeared in the books. For in-
stance, no recent appellate cases have discussed the rights and duties of a
receiver of a state bank under the Banking Code. It may be anticipated that,
within the next few years, this situation will change, due to the numerous
cases now pending involving the Sharpstown State Bank.
113 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1970). See also 12 U.S.C. 5 197 (Supp. 1972), which provides
that after all creditors are paid a meeting of the shareholders of the bank is to be called
by giving notice thereof for thirty days in a local newspaper; at the meeting, the shareholders
determine whether the FDIC is to continue as a receiver to wind up the association's affairs,
or whether an agent is to be elected for that purpose.
16An additional dividend of 13% is expected. Hearing on the Activities of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Involving Closed Insured Banks Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1971).
"'Id. at 58.
"'An additional dividend of 10% is expected. Id.
"'An additional dividend of 54% is expected. Id.
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